Time Itself Is Eternal, For It Is Neither Just Any Time, Nor The Moment Now, But Time Qua Time Is Its

Time itself is eternal, for it is neither just any time, nor the moment now, but time qua time is its concept. The concept, however, in its identity with itself I = I, is in and for itself absolute negativity and freedom. Time, is not, therefore, the power of the concept, nor is the concept in time and temporal; on the contrary, the concept is the power of time, which is only this negativity as externality. - The natural is therefore subordinate to time, insofar as it is finite; that which is true, by contrast, the idea, the spirit, is eternal. Thus the concept of eternity must not be grasped as if it were suspended time, or in any case not in the sense that eternity would come after time, for this would turn eternity into the future, in other words into a moment of time. And the concept of eternity must also not be understood in the sense of a negation of time, so that it would be merely an abstraction of time. For time in its concept is, like the concept itself generally, eternal, and therefore also absolute presence.

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Philosophy of Nature

Englishmen and Germans are blood brothers, descended from the same stern Woden-worshipping ancestors, blessed with the same rugged virtues, and fired with the same noble ambitions. In a world of diverse and hostile races the joint mission of these virile men is one of union and co-operation with their fellow-Teutons in defense of civilisation against the onslaughts of all others.

H.P. Lovecraft

The earthly kingdom of desires out of which logic grew: the herd instinct in the background. The assumption of similar cases presupposes ‘similar souls.’ For the purpose of mutual agreement and dominion.

Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power

Sovereign is he who decides on the exception.

Carl Schmitt, Political Theology

We moderns, or, to speak more broadly, all post-Greek humanity, have for a long time been so deflected that we understand looking exclusively as man’s representational self-direction toward beings. But in this way looking does not at all come into sight; instead it is understood only as a self-accomplished “activity,” i.e., an act of re-presenting. To re-present means here to present before oneself, to bring before oneself and to master, to attack things. The Greeks experience looking at first and properly as the way man emerges and comes into presence, with other beings, but as man in his essence. Thinking as moderns and therefore insufficiently, but for us surely more understandably, we can say in short: the look, θέα, is not looking as activity and act of the “subject” but is sight as the emerging of the “object” and its coming to our encounter. Looking is self-showing and indeed that self-showing in which the essence of the encounter-ing person has gathered itself and in which the encountering person “emerges” in the double sense that his essence is collected in the look, as the sum of his existence, and that this collectedness and simple totality of his essence opens itself to the look—opens itself at any rate in order to let come into presence in the unconcealed at the same time the concealment and the abyss of his essence.

Martin Heidegger, Parmenides

Although the liberal bourgeoisie wanted a god, its god could not become active; it wanted a monarch, but he had to be powerless; it demanded freedom and equality but limited voting rights to the propertied classes in order to ensure the influence of education and property on legislation, as if education and property entitled that class to repress the poor and uneducated; it abolished the aristocracy of blood and family but permitted the impudent rule of the moneyed aristocracy, the most ignorant and the most ordinary form of an aristocracy; it wanted neither the sovereignty of the king nor that of the people. What did it actually want?

Carl Schmitt, Political Theology

It wants revenge